BIENVENIDOS A MI PAGINA (ERICSON)

*posted by ericsonelectronics @ 4/26/2020 01:29:00 a. m.* 0COMENTARIOS

In general decompilers are not friendly with c++ let's analyse a simple program to get familiar with it.
Let's implement a simple code that loads a file into a vector and then save the vector with following functions:

err
load
save
main

Lets identify the typical way in C++ to print to stdout with the operator "<<"

The basic_ostream is initialized writing the word "error" to the cout, and then the operator<< again to add the endl.

The Main function simply calls "vec = load(filename)" but the compiler modified it and passed the vector pointer as a parámeter. Then it bulds and prints "loaded " << size << " users".
And finally saves the vector to /tmp/pwd and print "saved".
Most of the mess is basically the operator "<<" to concat and print values.
Also note that the vectors and strings are automatically deallocated when exit the function.

And here is the code:

Let's take a look to the load function, which iterates the ifs.getline() and push to the vector.
First of all there is a mess on the function definition, __return_storage_ptr is the vector.
the ifstream object ifs is initialized as a basic_ifstream and then operator! checks if it wasn't possible to open the file and in that case calls err()
We see the memset and a loop, getline read a cstr like line from the file, and then is converted to a string before pushing it to the vector. lVar1 is the stack canary value.

In this situations dont obfuscate with the vector pointer vec initialization at the begining, in this case the logic is quite clear.

The function save is a bit more tricky, but it's no more than a vector iteration and ofs writing.
Looping a simple "for (auto s : *vec)" in the decompiler is quite dense, but we can see clearly two write, the second write DAT_0010400b is a "\n"

As we see, save implememtation is quite straightforward.

IPsec and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

IPsec enables cryptographic protection of IP packets. It is commonly used to build VPNs (Virtual Private Networks). For key establishment, the IKE protocol is used. IKE exists in two versions, each with different modes, different phases, several authentication methods, and conﬁguration options. Therefore, IKE is one of the most complex cryptographic protocols in use.

In version 1 of IKE (IKEv1), four authentication methods are available for Phase 1, in which initial authenticated keying material is established: Two public key encryption based methods, one signature based method, and a PSK (Pre-Shared Key) based method.

The relationship between IKEv1 Phase 1, Phase 2, and IPsec ESP. Multiple simultaneous Phase 2 connections can be established from a single Phase 1 connection. Grey parts are encrypted, either with IKE derived keys (light grey) or with IPsec keys (dark grey). The numbers at the curly brackets denote the number of messages to be exchanged in the protocol.

Pre-Shared Key authentication

As shown above, Pre-Shared Key authentication is one of three authentication methods in IKEv1. The authentication is based on the knowledge of a shared secret string. In reality, this is probably some sort of password.

The IKEv1 handshake for PSK authentication looks like the following (simplified version):

In the first two messages, the session identifier (inside HDR) and the cryptographic algorithms (proposals) are selected by initiator and responder.

In messages 3 and 4, they exchange ephemeral Diffie-Hellman shares and nonces. After that, they compute a key k by using their shared secret (PSK) in a PRF function (e.g. HMAC-SHA1) and the previously exchanged nonces. This key is used to derive additional keys (k_a, k_d, k_e). The key k_d is used to compute MAC_I over the session identifier and the shared diffie-hellman secret g^xy. Finally, the key k_e is used to encrypt ID_I (e.g. IPv4 address of the peer) and MAC_I.

Weaknesses of PSK authentication

It is well known that the aggressive mode of authentication in combination with PSK is insecure and vulnerable against off-line dictionary attacks, by simply eavesedropping the packets. For example, in strongSwan it is necessary to set the following configuration flag in order to use it:

charon.i_dont_care_about_security_and_use_aggressive_mode_psk=yes

For the main mode, we found a similar attack when doing some minor additional work. For that, the attacker needs to waits until a peer A (initiator) tries to connect to another peer B (responder). Then, the attacker acts as a man-in-the middle and behaves like the peer B would, but does not forward the packets to B.

From the picture above it should be clear that an attacker who acts as B can compute (g^xy) and receives the necessary public values session ID, n_I, n_R. However, the attacker does not know the PSK. In order to mount a dictionary attack against this value, he uses the nonces, and computes a candidate for k for every entry in the dictionary. It is necessary to make a key derivation for every k with the values of the session identifiers and shared Diffie-Hellmann secret the possible keys k_a, k_d and k_e. Then, the attacker uses k_e in order to decrypt the encrypted part of message 5. Due to ID_I often being an IP address plus some additional data of the initiator, the attacker can easily determine if the correct PSK has been found.

Who is affected?

This weakness exists in the IKEv1 standard (RFC 2409). Every software or hardware that is compliant to this standard is affected. Therefore, we encourage all vendors, companies, and developers to at least ensure that high-entropy Pre-Shared Keys are used in IKEv1 configurations.

In order to verify the attack, we tested the attack against strongSWAN 5.5.1.

Proof-of-Concept

We have implemented a PoC that runs a dictionary attack against a network capture (pcapng) of a IKEv1 main mode session. As input, it also requires the Diffie-Hellmann secret as described above. You can find the source code at github. We only tested the attack against strongSWAN 5.5.1. If you want to use the PoC against another implementation or session, you have to adjust the idHex value in main.py.

Responsible Disclosure

We reported our ﬁndings to the international CERT at July 6th, 2018. We were informed that they contacted over 250 parties about the weakness. The CVE ID for it is CVE-2018-5389 [cert entry].

Credits

On August 10th, 2018, we learned that this attack against IKEv1 main mode with PSKs was previously described by David McGrew in his blog post Great Cipher, But Where Did You Get That Key?. We would like to point out that neither we nor the USENIX reviewers nor the CERT were obviously aware of this.
On August 14th 2018, Graham Bartlett (Cisco) email us that he presented the weakness of PSK in IKEv2 in several public presentations and in his book.
On August 15th 2018, we were informed by Tamir Zegman that John Pliam described the attack on his web page in 1999.

FAQs

Do you have a name, logo, any merchandising for the attack?
No.
Have I been attacked?
We mentioned above that such an attack would require an active man-in-the-middle attack. In the logs this could look like a failed connection attempt or a session timed out. But this is a rather weak indication and no evidence for an attack.
What should I do?
If you do not have the option to switch to authentication with digital signatures, choose a Pre-Shared Key that resists dictionary attacks. If you want to achieve e.g. 128 bits of security, configure a PSK with at least 19 random ASCII characters. And do not use something that can be found in public databases.
Am I safe if I use PSKs with IKEv2?
No, interestingly the standard also mentions that IKEv2 does not prevent against off-line dictionary attacks.
Where can I learn more?
You can read the paper. [alternative link to the paper]
What else does the paper contain?
The paper contains a lot more details than this blogpost. It explains all authentication methods of IKEv1 and it gives message flow diagrams of the protocol. There, we describe a variant of the attack that uses the Bleichenbacher oracles to forge signatures to target IKEv2.

Related word

*posted by ericsonelectronics @ 4/25/2020 11:56:00 a. m.* 0COMENTARIOS

Cybersecurity firm Cynet today announced the launch of a first of its kind challenge to enable Incident Response professionals to test their skills with 25 forensic challenges that were built by top researchers and analysts. The challenge is available on https://ift.tt/2Vrf4e0 and is open to anyone willing to test his or her investigation skills, between April 21st and May

via The Hacker News

IPsec and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

IPsec enables cryptographic protection of IP packets. It is commonly used to build VPNs (Virtual Private Networks). For key establishment, the IKE protocol is used. IKE exists in two versions, each with different modes, different phases, several authentication methods, and conﬁguration options. Therefore, IKE is one of the most complex cryptographic protocols in use.

In version 1 of IKE (IKEv1), four authentication methods are available for Phase 1, in which initial authenticated keying material is established: Two public key encryption based methods, one signature based method, and a PSK (Pre-Shared Key) based method.

Attacks on IKE implementations

With our attacks we can impersonate an IKE device: If the attack is successful, we share a set of (falsely) authenticated symmetric keys with the victim device, and can successfully complete the handshake – this holds for both IKEv1 and IKEv2. The attacks are based on Bleichenbacher oracles in the IKEv1 implementations of four large network equipment manufacturers: Cisco, Huawei, Clavister, and ZyXEL. These Bleichenbacher oracles can also be used to forge digital signatures, which breaks the signature based IKEv1 and IKEv2 variants. Those who are unfamiliar with Bleichenbacher attacks may read this post by our colleague Juraj Somorovsky for an explanation.

The affected hardware test devices by Huawei, Cisco, and ZyXEL in our network lab.

We show that the strength of these oracles is sufficient to break all handshake variants in IKEv1 and IKEv2 (except those based on PSKs) when given access to powerful network equipment. We furthermore demonstrate that key reuse across protocols as implemented in certain network equipment carries high security risks.

We additionally show that both PSK based modes can be broken with an offline dictionary attack if the PSK has low entropy. Such an attack was previously only documented for one of those modes (edit: see this comment). We thus show attacks against all authentication modes in both IKEv1 and IKEv2 under reasonable assumptions.

The relationship between IKEv1 Phase 1, Phase 2, and IPsec ESP. Multiple simultaneous Phase 2 connections can be established from a single Phase 1 connection. Grey parts are encrypted, either with IKE derived keys (light grey) or with IPsec keys (dark grey). The numbers at the curly brackets denote the number of messages to be exchanged in the protocol.

Where's the bug?

The public key encryption (PKE) based authentication mode of IKE requires that both parties exchanged their public keys securely beforehand (e. g. with certiﬁcates during an earlier handshake with signature based authentication). RFC 2409 advertises this mode of authentication with a plausibly deniable exchange to raise the privacy level. In this mode, messages three and four of the handshake exchange encrypted nonces and identities. They are encrypted using the public key of the respective other party. The encoding format for the ciphertexts is PKCS #1 v1.5.

Bleichenbacher attacks are adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks against RSA-PKCS #1 v1.5. Though the attack has been known for two decades, it is a common pitfall for developers. The mandatory use of PKCS #1 v1.5 in the PKE authentication methods raised suspicion of whether implementations resist Bleichenbacher attacks.

PKE authentication is available and fully functional in Cisco's IOS operating system. In Clavister's cOS and ZyXEL's ZyWALL USG devices, PKE is not ofﬁcially available. There is no documentation and no conﬁguration option for it and it is therefore not fully functional. Nevertheless, these implementations processed messages using PKE authentication in our tests.

Huawei implements a revised mode of the PKE mode mentioned in the RFC that saves one private key operation per peer (we call it RPKE mode). It is available in certain Huawei devices including the Secospace USG2000 series.

We were able to conﬁrm the existence of Bleichenbacher oracles in all these implementations. Here are the CVE entries and security advisories by the vendors (I will add links once they are available):

Cisco: CVE-2018-0131, Security Advisory
Huawei: CVE-2017-17305, Security Advisory
Clavister: CVE-2018-8753, Security Advisory
Zyxel: CVE-2018-9129, Security Advisory

On an abstract level, these oracles work as follows: If we replace the ciphertext of the nonce in the third handshake message with a modiﬁed RSA ciphertext, the responder will either indicate an error (Cisco, Clavister, and ZyXEL) or silently abort (Huawei) if the ciphertext is not PKCS #1 v1.5 compliant. Otherwise, the responder continues with the fourth message (Cisco and Huawei) or return an error notiﬁcation with a different message (Clavister and ZyXEL) if the ciphertext is in fact PKCS #1 v1.5 compliant. Each time we learn that the ciphertext was valid, we can advance the Bleichenbacher attack one more step.

A Bleichenbacher Attack Against PKE

If a Bleichenbacher oracle is discovered in a TLS implementation, then TLS-RSA is broken since one can compute the Premaster Secret and the TLS session keys without any time limit on the usage of the oracle. For IKEv1, the situation is more difﬁcult: Even if there is a strong Bleichenbacher oracle in PKE and RPKE mode, our attack must succeed within the lifetime of the IKEv1 Phase 1 session, since a Diffie-Hellman key exchange during the handshake provides an additional layer of security that is not present in TLS-RSA. For example, for Cisco this time limit is currently ﬁxed to 60 seconds for IKEv1 and 240 seconds for IKEv2.

To phrase it differently: In TLS-RSA, a Bleichenbacher oracle allows to perform an ex post attack to break the conﬁdentiality of the TLS session later on, whereas in IKEv1 a Bleichenbacher oracle only can be used to perform an online attack to impersonate one of the two parties in real time.

Bleichenbacher attack against IKEv1 PKE based authentication.

The figure above depicts a direct attack on IKEv1 PKE:

The attackers initiate an IKEv1 PKE based key exchange with Responder A and adhere to the protocol until receiving the fourth message. They extract the encrypted nonce from this message, and record the other public values of the handshake.
The attackers keep the IKE handshake with Responder A alive as long as the responder allows. For Cisco and ZyXEL we know that handshakes are cancelled after 60 seconds, Clavister and Huawei do so after 30 seconds.
The attackers initiate several parallel PKE based key exchanges to Responder B.

In each of these exchanges, they send and receive the ﬁrst two messages according to the protocol speciﬁcations.
In the third message, they include a modiﬁed version of the encrypted nonce according to the the Bleichenbacher attack methodology.
They wait until they receive an answer or they can reliably determine that this message will not be sent (timeout or reception of a repeated second handshake message).

After receiving enough answers from Responder B, the attackers can compute the plaintext of the nonce.
The attackers now have all the information to complete the key derivation and the handshake. They thus can impersonate Responder B to Responder A.

Key Reuse

Maintaining individual keys and key pairs for each protocol version, mode, and authentication method of IKE is difﬁcult to achieve in practice. It is oftentimes simply not supported by implementations. This is the case with the implementations by Clavister and ZyXEL, for example. Thus, it is common practice to have only one RSA key pair for the whole IKE protocol family. The actual security of the protocol family in this case crucially depends on its cross-ciphersuite and cross-version security. In fact, our Huawei test device reuses its RSA key pair even for SSH host identification, which further exposes this key pair.

A Cross-Protocol Version Attack with Digital Signature Based Authentication

Signature Forgery Using Bleichenbacher's Attack

It is well known that in the case of RSA, performing a decryption and creating a signature is mathematically the same operation. Bleichenbacher's original paper already mentioned that the attack could also be used to forge signatures over attacker-chosen data. In two papers that my colleagues at our chair have published, this has been exploited for attacks on XML-based Web Services, TLS 1.3, and Google's QUIC protocol. The ROBOT paper used this attack to forge a signature from Facebook's web servers as proof of exploitability.

IKEv2 With Digital Signatures

Digital signature based authentication is supported by both IKEv1 and IKEv2. We focus here on IKEv2 because on Cisco routers, an IKEv2 handshake may take up to four minutes. This more relaxed timer compared to IKEv1 makes it an interesting attack target.

I promised that this blogpost will only give a comprehensive summary, therefore I am skipping all the details about IKEv2 here. It is enough to know that the structure of IKEv2 is fundamentally different from IKEv1.

If you're familiar with IT-security, then you will believe me that if digital signatures are used for authentication, it is not particularly good if an attacker can get a signature over attacker chosen data. We managed to develop an attack that exploits an IKEv1 Bleichenbacher oracle at some peer A to get a signature that can be used to break the IKEv2 authentication at another peer B. This requires that peer A reuses its key pair for IKEv2 also for IKEv1. For the details, please read our paper [alternative link to the paper].

Evaluation and Results

For testing the attack, we used a Cisco ASR 1001-X router running IOS XE in version 03.16.02.S with IOS version 15.5(3)S2. Unfortunately, Cisco's implementation is not optimized for throughput. From our observations we assume that all cryptographic calculations for IKE are done by the device's CPU despite it having a hardware accelerator for cryptography. One can easily overload the device's CPU for several seconds with a standard PC bursting handshake messages, even with the default limit for concurrent handshakes. And even if the CPU load is kept below 100 %, we nevertheless observed packet loss.

For the decryption attack on Cisco's IKEv1 responder, we need to ﬁnish the Bleichenbacher attack in 60 seconds. If the public key of our ASR 1001-X router is 1024 bits long, we measured an average of 850 responses to Bleichenbacher requests per second. Therefore, an attack must succeed with at most 51,000 Bleichenbacher requests.

But another limit is the management of Security Associations (SAs). There is a global limit of 900 Phase 1 SAs under negotiation per Cisco device in the default conﬁguration. If this number is exceeded, one is blocked. Thus, one cannot start individual handshakes for each Bleichenbacher request to issue. Instead, SAs have to be reused as long as their error counter allows. Furthermore, establishing SAs with Cisco IOS is really slow. During the attack, the negotiations in the first two messages of IKEv1 require more time than the actual Bleichenbacher attack.

We managed to perform a successful decryption attack against our ASR 1001-X router with approximately 19,000 Bleichenbacher requests. However, due to the necessary SA negotiations, the attack took 13 minutes.

For the statistics and for the attack evaluation of digital signature forgery, we used a simulator with an oracle that behaves exactly as the ones by Cisco, Clavister, and ZyXEL. We found that about 26% of attacks against IKEv1 could be successful based on the cryptographic performance of our Cisco device. For digital signature forgery, about 22% of attacks could be successful under the same assumptions.

Note that (without a patched IOS), only non-cryptographic performance issues prevented a succesful attack on our Cisco device. There might be faster devices that do not suffer from this. Also note that a too slow Bleichenbacher attack does not permanently lock out attackers. If a timeout occurs, they can just start over with a new attack using fresh values hoping to require fewer requests. If the victim has deployed multiple responders sharing one key pair (e. g. for load balancing), this could also be leveraged to speed up an attack.

Responsible Disclosure

We reported our ﬁndings to Cisco, Huawei, Clavister, and ZyXEL. Cisco published ﬁxes with IOS XE versions 16.3.6, 16.6.3, and 16.7.1. They further informed us that the PKE mode will be removed with the next major release.

Huawei published ﬁrmware version V300R001C10SPH702 for the Secospace USG2000 series that removes the Bleichenbacher oracle and the crash bugs we identiﬁed. Customers who use other affected Huawei devices will be contacted directly by their support team as part of a need-to-know strategy.

Clavister removed the vulnerable authentication method with cOS version 12.00.09. ZyXEL responded that our ZyWALL USG 100 test device is from a legacy model series that is end-of-support. Therefore, these devices will not receive a ﬁx. For the successor models, the patched ﬁrmware version ZLD 4.32 (Release Notes) is available.

FAQs

Why don't you have a cool name for this attack?
The attack itself already has a name, it's Bleichenbacher's attack. We just show how Bleichenbacher attacks can be applied to IKE and how they can break the protocol's security. So, if you like, call it IPsec-Bleichenbacher or IKE-Bleichenbacher.
Do you have a logo for the attack?
No.
My machine was running a vulnerable firmware. Have I been attacked?
We have no indication that the attack was ever used in the wild. However, if you are still concerned, check your logs. The attack is not silent. If your machine was used for a Bleichenbacher attack, there should be many log entries about decryption errors. If your machine was the one that got tricked (Responder A in our figures), then you could probably find log entries about unfinished handshake attempts.
Where can I learn more?
First of all, you can read the paper [alternative link to the paper]. Second, you can watch the presentation, either live at the conference or later on this page.
What else does the paper contain?
The paper contains a lot more details than this blogpost. It explains all authentication methods including IKEv2 and it gives message flow diagrams of the protocols. There, we describe a variant of the attack that uses the Bleichenbacher oracles to forge signatures to target IKEv2. Furthermore, we describe the quirks of Huawei's implementation including crash bugs that could allow for Denial-of-Service attacks. Last but not least, it describes a dictionary attack against the PSK mode of authentication that is covered in a separate blogpost.

Media Coverage, Blogs, and more

English

German

Continue reading

*posted by ericsonelectronics @ 4/25/2020 07:26:00 a. m.* 0COMENTARIOS

Recovering data from a backup should be an easy thing to do. At least this is what you expect. Yesterday I had a problem which should have been easy to solve, but it was not. I hope this blog post can help others who face the same problem.

The problem

1. I had an encrypted Time Machine backup which was not used for months
2. This backup was not on an official Apple Time Capsule or on a USB HDD, but on a WD MyCloud NAS
3. I needed files from this backup
4. After running out of time I only had SSH access to the macOS, no GUI

The struggle

By default, Time Machine is one of the best and easiest backup solution I have seen. As long as you stick to the default use case, where you have one active backup disk, life is pink and happy. But this was not my case.

As always, I started to Google what shall I do. One of the first options recommended that I add the backup disk to Time Machine, and it will automagically show the backup snapshots from the old backup. Instead of this, it did not show the old snapshots but started to create a new backup. Panic button has been pressed, backup canceled, back to Google.

Other tutorials recommend to click on the Time Machine icon and pressing alt (Option) key, where I can choose "Browse other backup disks". But this did not list the old Time Machine backup. It did list the backup when selecting disks in Time Machine preferences, but I already tried and failed that way.

YAT (yet another tutorial) recommended to SSH into the NAS, and browse the backup disk, as it is just a simple directory where I can see all the files. But all the files inside where just a bunch of nonsense, no real directory structure.

YAT (yet another tutorial) recommended that I can just easily browse the content of the backup from the Finder by double-clicking on the sparse bundle file. After clicking on it, I can see the disk image on the left part of the Finder, attached as a new disk.
Well, this is true, but because of some bug, when you connect to the Time Capsule, you don't see the sparse bundle file. And I got inconsistent results, for the WD NAS, double-clicking on the sparse bundle did nothing. For the Time Capsule, it did work.
At this point, I had to leave the location where the backup was present, and I only had remote SSH access. You know, if you can't solve a problem, let's complicate things by restrict yourself in solutions.

Finally, I tried to check out some data forensics blogs, and besides some expensive tools, I could find the solution.

The solution

Finally, a blog post provided the real solution - hdiutil.
The best part of hdiutil is that you can provide the read-only flag to it. This can be very awesome when it comes to forensics acquisition.

To mount any NAS via SMB:

mount_smbfs afp://<username>@<NAS_IP>/<Share_for_backup> /<mountpoint>

To mount a Time Capsule share via AFP:

mount_afp afp://any_username:password@<Time_Capsule_IP>/<Share_for_backup> /<mountpoint>

And finally this command should do the job:

hdiutil attach test.sparsebundle -readonly

It is nice that you can provide read-only parameter.

If the backup was encrypted and you don't want to provide the password in a password prompt, use the following:

printf '%s' 'CorrectHorseBatteryStaple' | hdiutil attach test.sparsebundle -stdinpass -readonly

Note: if you receive the error "resource temporarily unavailable", probably another machine is backing up to the device

And now, you can find your backup disk under /Volumes. Happy restoring!

Probably it would have been quicker to either enable the remote GUI, or to physically travel to the system and login locally, but that would spoil the fun.More articles

*posted by ericsonelectronics @ 4/25/2020 12:43:00 a. m.* 0COMENTARIOS

The Zed Attack Proxy team is pleased to announce two recently released initiatives:

ZAP In Ten

The team have just launched a new series of videos called 'ZAP in Ten' in conjunction with AllDayDevOps.

ZAP in Ten is a series of short form videos featuring Simon Bennetts, project lead of the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) project. Each video highlights a specific feature or resource for ZAP.

ZAP API Docs

As part of OWASP's participation in Google's Season of Docs, the ZAP project has had @sshniro working on API documentation. The first iteration of the documentation is now live. It includes Java, Python, and shell example snippets all presented in a responsive and accessible design. Which we will continue to build on in the future.

Big thanks to Nirojan for his efforts on this wonderful initiative! Congratulations and thanks to Google Open Source for helping to bring the open source and technical writer communities together!Related news

Welcome to my 4th new tutorial of the series of networking. In this blog you'll the content about network switches. You'll learn about how to make a communication successful and secure in the same network (LAN) by using STP. As Spanning tree protocol (STP) we used in multi-switched networks. Why we use this protocol in multi-switched network etc.

What is Switch?

A switch is an intelligent device used to connect multiple devices within the same network. The intelligence of is that it requires Media Access Control (MAC) address for communication and doesn't allow broadcast. Let's understand the whole thing by a little example, consider there is a network having 3 end devices name Device-A, Device-B,Device-C connected with each other respectively with the help of switch. When a Device-A sends data to Device-C so that data will only forwarded by switch to Device-C not to Device-B.

What is Media Access Control (MAC) address?

A Media Access Control (MAC) address is 48-bit unique physical address given to network interface controller (NIC) or network adapter, for communication within the same network which is given by its manufacturer. It is made up of hexadecimal numbers like a1:b1:cc:ac:2e:f1.

What is STP?

STP stands for Spanning tree protocol which is basically used in bridge and switches to prevent loops when you have a redundant links in the Ethernet networks. If the loop is present in the Ethernet network so the whole network will suffer because there will MAC instability in the MAC table, duplicate frames generation and so on. Let's move to the video for further detail.

BIENVENIDOS A MI PAGINA (ERICSON)

domingo, abril 26, 2020

Reversing Some C++ Io Operations

Read more

sábado, abril 25, 2020

Practical Dictionary Attack On IPsec IKE

IPsec and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

Pre-Shared Key authentication

Weaknesses of PSK authentication

Who is affected?

Proof-of-Concept

Responsible Disclosure

Credits

FAQs

Related word

The Incident Response Challenge 2020 — Win $5,000 Prize!

Related posts

Practical Bleichenbacher Attacks On IPsec IKE

IPsec and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

Attacks on IKE implementations

Where's the bug?

A Bleichenbacher Attack Against PKE

Key Reuse

A Cross-Protocol Version Attack with Digital Signature Based Authentication

Signature Forgery Using Bleichenbacher's Attack

IKEv2 With Digital Signatures

Evaluation and Results

Responsible Disclosure

FAQs

Media Coverage, Blogs, and more

English

German

Continue reading

Recovering Data From An Old Encrypted Time Machine Backup

The problem

The struggle

The solution

OWASP ZAP Project - Zed Attack Proxy Team Releases Two Initiatives

The Zed Attack Proxy team is pleased to announce two recently released initiatives:

ZAP In Ten

ZAP API Docs

viernes, abril 24, 2020

Networking | Routing And Switching | Tutorial 4 | 2018

What is Switch?

What is Media Access Control (MAC) address?

What is STP?